



# NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW

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## Strategic Outlook 2008: National Security Issues for the Next Administration

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ECONOMICS OR FORCE: THE PREDICATE TO NEGOTIATED  
POLICY CHANGE IN IRAN

**Richard E. Friedman**

INDIA: AMERICA'S NEW GENDARME OR STRATEGIC PARTNER?

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U.S. INTELLIGENCE: AMERICA'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE

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CYBER CONFLICT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT  
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21ST CENTURY

**Peter R. Faber**

**Book Review of Thomas Friedman's *Hot, Flat, and Crowded***

**MARILYN DIAMOND**

# NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW

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# NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW

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# Letter from the Publisher

*Richard E. Friedman*

**U.S.** national security is most vulnerable during the two and one-half month period between the election and inauguration. The outgoing national security team is in place, but may be dispirited, away from their office for deferred vacation time, or they may be seeking new employment. If a crisis develops, difficult decisions would tend to be deferred and given to the incoming administration national security team.

The second phase of vulnerability begins at 12:01 PM on Inauguration Day – the first of an arbitrary 100-day installation process for the new administration. The new president's popularity is at its high point while his power to make and implement decisions is at its lowest. Key positions may be filled quickly, but the second and third tier appointments will lag because of political debts to be paid, and the complex vetting and security clearance process. This is the prime time for a terrorist attack.

The seven-day, 24-hour news cycle will focus attention on promises that were made during the presidential campaign. Failure to honor commitments, which may have been made without due consideration of their consequences, will begin the slide of the

new president's credibility and begin the inexorable downward popularity spiral. State competitors, adversaries, and enemies will test the new president who may have only a skeleton executive office staff and national security team in place who can provide support and guidance.

For most mature administrations, management and the mechanisms and processes that lead to decision making are at best marginal. A long-range national strategy is not on the horizon because of the need to attend to the daily task of putting out fires. *Ad hoc* decisions will be made that will morph into unintended policies that are difficult to modify or reverse. Although a new administration will seek to be proactive, the reality is that it will be in a reactive mode for at least the first 100 days.

There are several categories of threats and issues that will confront the new president: the persistent, unresolved issues of the past four years of the former administration, and the unforeseen and unknown issues. The unknown issues are derived from the combination of known issues – variables – either individually or cumulatively, which will appear with little or no advance warning. Assuming that the new president is oriented towards

consultation with his national security team (not a secure assumption based on the first four years of the Clinton administration and the eight years of the Bush-II administration), there will be ego and turf-related tensions between the White House and national security-related Departments and Agencies and similar intra-departmental and agency conflicts.

A national security team is broader than a few presidential cronies. It should be an ensemble competent to identify patterns, sort out what is important and what is not, prioritize and implement decisions, and consider the likely consequences of actions to be taken. They should also have the ability to communicate and persuade Congress and the American and international public that U.S. policy is appropriate and consistent with the American ethos and values, and that it is likely to be efficacious. The likelihood that a gaggle of appointees will morph into a balanced, adaptive, and nimble ensemble in a short period of time is slim and none.

The president has adversaries, foreign and domestic. Foreign enemies are usually incorrigible. Adversaries can be manipulated to prevent them from becoming enemies or competitors. Competitors can be managed by listening to them and understanding their objectives – a complementary strategy.

The notion of “‘rally round’ the flag” is not limited to the early stage of a war. Patriotism is in the American gut. Intellect can soften raw emotion. A president can achieve intellectual and emotional support if he or she recognizes that an informed citizenry requires that it be consulted and that the cumulative wisdom of the American public may be the most important member of the national security team.

A new president has both untapped public support, and approximately one-half of the public who voted for the other candidate – adversaries who need to be persuaded that new policies and decisions are in their self-interest.

We have asked National Strategy Forum friends and scholars to examine the most pressing national security issues the next Administration will confront. Authors have provided critical analysis and recommendations. We encourage readers to access past issues of the *NSFR* on our website, [www.nationalstrategy.com](http://www.nationalstrategy.com), which also features links to our conference summaries and special reports. •

# Economics or Force: The Predicate to Negotiated Policy Change in Iran

*Richard E. Friedman*

The U.S. has had no constant, comprehensive strategy towards Iran. The U.S. has had an oscillating reactive policy impelled by the belief that Iran has an advanced nuclear weapons development program, its support for terrorism through its proxies, and its growing political influence in Iraq. The U.S. premise of its own primacy in the Middle East has proven to be incorrect and needs to be reexamined.

The new reality is that Iran has become the superpower in the region, with or without a nuclear weapon. Iran's strategic objective is clear: to enhance its superpower status and to diminish U.S. power and influence in the region.

The U.S. needs to identify its own strategic objectives, craft realistic policies, and implement them skillfully and expeditiously. The U.S. strategic objectives regarding Iran: cease nuclear weapons development, cease support for acts of terrorism, and cease its political meddling in Iraq.

Blunt U.S. military force in Iraq did not result in victory because it was not accompanied by diplomacy - politics and cultural sensitivity were lacking. The same approach will not work in Iran. Another dimension is needed.

Iran has severe domestic and international financial concerns. The U.S.

has begun to use financial leverage in hope that it will modify Iran's policies and perhaps result in regime change.

Iran has become a superpower in the region because it can effectively manipulate Iraq through nuanced political pressure, implemented by Iran-leaning Shias in Iraq. Iran does not need a nuclear weapon because it has major oil revenue. However, U.S. options in the Middle East are perceived to be slim and none. Iran's nuclear program is not a bargaining chip with the U.S. Rather it enhances Iran's real and perceived superpower status.

It is unlikely that Iran's neighbors in the Middle East and North Africa will be passive regarding a nuclear armed Iran. The necessary technology and available funding resources needed to fuel a nuclear arms race are present in the region. All that is required is a relatively small amount of fissile nuclear material. The variable is whether Iran will go to the nuclear brink and then stand down to avoid a regional nuclear arms race. The December 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) states Iran ceased nuclear weapons development in 2003, and thus, is not an imminent nuclear threat. However, U.S. and international intelligence has a poor track record in this regard.

The U.S. focus on Iran's nuclear objective may have obscured other positive possibilities: diplomacy through the U.N., which is unlikely to be effective, or a spontaneous democracy-driven revolution resulting in regime change, which is also unlikely.

### *The Economic Option*

Economics may be the most effective U.S. chip in its relationship with Iran. Iran has bad banking practices – minimal oversight and widespread money laundering. Reputable banks do not want to do business with Iran's banks, because they do not adhere to international banking standards. Currently, more than 80 international banks will not deal with Iran's banks. If this initiative grows, it could result in the exclusion of Iran from the international financial system. Another possibility is a U.S. Treasury initiative based on Iran's failure to adhere to international insurance and transportation standards: exclusion from international finance, insurance, and transportation sectors could result in severe domestic political instability.

Iran depends on imported gasoline – 40 percent of its domestic needs. Although it produces far more crude oil than it needs, Iran purchases virtually all of its imported oil from Swiss, Indian, Dutch, French, and British companies. The U.S. could request that these companies cease selling their gasoline to Iran. These companies could sell

their gasoline to other purchasers without loss of profit. These companies could respond to U.S. leverage. For example, the Swiss company is building a large terminal in Florida using state tax incentives; an Indian company recently received a \$500 million loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank.

The U.S. can negotiate with these companies to cease sales of gasoline to Iran based on the premise that they will lose more loan guarantees and profits in the U.S. than would be gained by continuing to do business with Iran. The best support for the "economic squeeze" proposal comes from recent statements made by Iranian economists. They believe that foreign investment is critical, but has not been forthcoming. Current "weak" sanctions against Iran are very costly for them. The reduction of gasoline imports would strangle their economy.

Iran has subsidized its domestic gasoline prices. The major decrease in global oil prices confronts Iran with two options: cut domestic subsidies, or tap into its \$80 billion in hard currency reserves, much of which is deposited in banks located outside of Iran.

Professor John Norton Moore is a distinguished international law scholar and Director of the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia. He has written a compelling argument in support of civil suits against terror states (Iran) that should become part of a U.S. counter-terrorism strategy and policy. The core

principle of Professor Moore's proposal is that international law supports civil judgments against terror states and enforcement of judgments by democratic states. The 1996 Foreign Sovereignty Immunity Act (FSIA) – not FISA – provides the exclusive basis for suits against foreign nations in U.S. courts. FSIA was substantially strengthened by the recent "Lautenberg Amendment" which enlarges the class of parties who have standing to sue to include members of the U.S. Armed Forces and employees or contractors of the U.S. government.

The U.S. has not applied the ordinary rule of law to seek civil monetary damages against states that sponsor terrorism. Large monetary civil judgments against Iran are another peaceful initiative available to the U.S.

Economic pressure, coupled with domestic political protests, is a compelling rationale for Iran to cease nuclear weapons development, cease its terrorism activity, and cease its political influence in Iraq. The predicate to U.S. discussion with Iran is the "economic squeeze" which provides considerable negotiating leverage.

*The Changing Legal Rationale  
for Armed Conflict*

Looking ahead to the next four years, circumstances may require the U.S. to consider the projection of military force. The contemporary military experience in Iraq provides an opportunity to reflect on causation,

political considerations, the Rule of Law, and unforeseen consequences.

Iran has recently announced that it has substantially increased its array of centrifuges bringing it closer to the goal of producing enriched uranium, which is the fissile material needed to make a nuclear weapon. If diplomacy and economic sanctions do not prevent Iran from acquiring its nuclear weapons, the U.S. and Western Democracies must decide whether to use military force to prevent this, with or without color of the rule of law.

The U.S. and Western Democracies pride themselves on their adherence to the Rule of Law. However, armed conflict in the context of international law blurs what constitutes adherence or non-adherence to international law for two reasons:

- The nature and causation of armed conflict has changed. The international law standard for war is derived from early 19th century legal precedent. This was a time when troops assembled on a border over an extended period of time for a cross-border invasion.
- The technology of conflict has changed. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) can be hidden and the threatened state has little or no time to react. Moreover, in the 19th century context, massing of troops was apparent. By contrast, the contemporary existence of and the likelihood of immediate use of WMDs is hidden, unknown, or speculative.



The doctrine of *preemption* as an international norm arose from the *Caroline* case (1837)... “necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation”. There are two considerations for the exercise of self-defense: an imminent threat, which is supported by actionable intelligence.

Political partisanship clouds whether the U.S. invasion of Iraq adhered to the international norm of *preemption*. The intelligence communities of the U.S. and Western Democracies arrayed what they believed to be actionable intelligence that Iraq possessed WMDs and would use these weapons in the immediate future. Subsequent investigation demonstrated that this intelligence was incorrect.

The doctrine of *preemption* is in the process of adapting to contemporary threats – WMDs and terrorism. A new international doctrine is emerging – *preventive* war. The key difference is temporal: what constitutes *imminence*. If a threatened state believes, based on actionable intelligence, that a state or non-state actor is developing or has developed the capability of using WMDs or exercising acts of terrorism, the threatened state can prevent the threat from being exercised against it by using its own countervailing force as a means of self-defense. The legal issue of *imminence* – how soon can self-defense force be used – is unsettled.

International law changes at a very slow pace. This creates the conditions

for the intersection or collision of law and politics. Political leaders, when contemplating the use of force in self-defense, have a difficult choice to make. They can adhere strictly to the *Caroline* standard of *preemption* - wait until the very last moment before they are attacked; they can ignore international law (*preemption*); or they can adapt to the unsettled principle of *preventive* war in hope that they are adhering to the Rule of Law or that international law norms will adapt to perceived political reality. •

**Richard E. Friedman** is Publisher of the *National Strategy Forum Review* and President of the National Strategy Forum.

# India: America's New Gendarme or Strategic Partner?

*Frank Schell*

Like a busy beaver in the Wisconsin Chippewa flowage, for many years America built an extensive array of gendarmerie in the Third World to block Soviet expansionism. Since the end of World War II, some of those proxy states were tripwires against Soviet tank divisions, while others were conceived as ideological fronts against global Communism. There was the American engineered deposition of Guzmán in Guatemala, the sponsorship of Mobutu in Zaire, Suharto in Indonesia, and the coup by Pinochet in Chile. There was Marcos in the Philippines, the Shah of Iran, and a number of mostly military regimes in Pakistan, where the U-2 spy flights originated in the early days of the Cold War. Lastly, there were the mujahideen in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion and occupation.

For the most part, the U.S. supported regimes with values antithetical to our own, led by inexperienced or awkward autocrats whose mission was to suppress the populace, extract national resources for private gain and construct crude kleptocracies. Those countries were seen by the U.S. through the prism of national security, with a principal interface through the Military Assistance Advisory Group of the Pentagon or the Central Intelligence

Agency. There was little attention paid to the importance of human rights and the longer term development of democracy, however from a practical point of view it was difficult for U.S. diplomats to cultivate ties with opposition elements in authoritarian regimes.

All this time, India was a major strategic annoyance to the U.S. Although it was a like-minded secular democracy and federal republic, it did not benefit in the U.S. calculus for global security. To the contrary, there have been about five decades of chill out between Washington and New Delhi. There was American distaste for Indian avowed non-alignment, while at the same time a client state of the Soviet Union, purchasing Soviet MiGs, tanks, and submarines, as well as Belarus tractors, and other equipment and spare parts. Indira Gandhi's declaration of a state of emergency to persecute political adversaries also did not sit well in Washington.

Further, there was hectoring of the U.S. about the evils of foreign capital and neo-imperialism. And there was Indian antipathy toward the U.S. for its support and arming of Pakistan – a South Asian archrival that subverted democracy in what is now Bangladesh, and continues to foster insur-

gency in the Indian state of Kashmir. A low moment in the Indo-U.S. relationship was the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 conflict with Pakistan, when India supported the democratically elected government and independence of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan.

In the case of Pakistan, the U.S. elected to align itself with Pakistani Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, and Zia-ul-Haq, who is acknowledged to have introduced Sharia principles and Islamic influence into the army and intelligence service, and encouraged development of the madrassa Islamic schools. In 1973, our major ally renamed itself the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Until his recent resignation, the U.S. supported General Pervez Musharraf, who it was hoped would prevail against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the remote tribal regions of Pakistan.

Understandably, India has been disturbed by America's unrelenting focus on Pakistan, with which India has had three major conflicts since 1947, and fighting over the Line of Control in Kargil (a region of Kashmir) in 1999. The world's largest and second largest democracies have had a painfully dysfunctional relationship, guided by the false dichotomy of having either national security or human rights, and the related U.S. need to fundamentally support either Pakistan or India.

However, new geopolitical forces offer India and the U.S. the unprecedented opportunity to forge a strategic

partnership to benefit both countries in terms of national security and economic development. These forces include the collapse of the Soviet Union and India's desire for new sponsorship, the economic liberalization of India and its creation of a free market system, the ascent of China, the presence of failed or ineffective states on or near its borders, and the related rise of Islamist extremism globally and in India.

The failings of central planning and control are now well-known, with the Soviet model roundly rejected by India, which liberalized trade and investment starting in 1991 with continuous focus to the present. The full matrix of American support may now be applied – trade and direct investment, diplomacy and military cooperation, business process outsourcing, education and cultural exchange, collaboration in space and high technology, nuclear technology transfer, and drug enforcement activities. By some accounts, the Indian people are unique in their generally favorable view of the United States. If there is a foreign partner with the scale, technology, and reach that can help India achieve its national priorities – education, public health, infrastructure development, and social services delivery – it is the United States.

India may also be seen to counter Chinese influence in Asia, given its potential to overtake the Japanese economy in terms of (PPP) GDP in coming years. While India has the world's fifth largest navy, with blue water capability to protect its maritime routes from

the Persian Gulf to southeast Asia, there is nevertheless the issue of whether it can really compete with the scale and technology of the Chinese shipyards.

India and America share a fear of terrorism. India needs a stable Pakistan on its frontier, a country needing effective institutions and control of its borders. Kashmir will always be an area of dispute, and India can retaliate by destabilizing the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. However, these separatist tensions need not prevent both countries from recognizing that they have one strategic commonality: Fear of Islamist extremism, which should trump other differences.

Although Muslim, the Pakistani provinces of Sindh and Punjab have marked similarities – ethnic, linguistic, and cultural – to the adjoining Indian states of Gujarat, Rajasthan and Punjab, which are predominantly Hindu and Sikh. In Pakistan, ethnic Sindhis and Punjabis represent nearly 60 percent of the population of 173 million (CIA World Factbook July 2008 estimate) and those two provinces have the bulk of Pakistan's agricultural production, manufacturing and services, banking and commerce – sharing a similar entrepreneurial spirit with India, where many of them originally migrated from after partition in 1947.

With 150 million of its own Muslims, India is vulnerable to traditional Hindu-Muslim communalism, as well as to a more recent form of Is-

lamist insurgency. One example is the Lashkar-e-Taiba, believed aligned with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the Pakistani ISI (intelligence service), which has engaged in major agitation and terrorism in Kashmir. Further, some of the recent serial bombings in major Indian cities have been attributed to SIMI, a homegrown student Islamic organization, and to suspected Muslim radicals operating in the northeastern state of Assam. There are also Hindu groups such as the Shiv Sena and RSS which are viewed as extremists and add to the volatility of the region.

At this writing, the terrorist attacks in Mumbai demonstrate a new boldness in terms of scale and coordination, the use of foreigners as hostages, and targeting of national architectural landmarks, the Taj Mahal Hotel and the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus of the Western Railways. Expected collaboration with U.S., British and Israeli intelligence agencies to analyze these attacks will strengthen the perception that India is now a staunch ally of the West. Suspicion inevitably falls on its neighbor; however, Pakistan the state, and rogue elements in the ISI and army supported by Al-Qaeda, are two different matters. In any case, there is a dearth of reported evidence to attribute blame.

Like the majority of the Pakistani middle class, business and government establishment, the Indians fear more influence of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in rural and urban areas of Pakistan, where there is already significant penetration.

Alongside U.S. and NATO coalition operations, Indian influence has grown in Afghanistan, with an advisory presence in Kabul, and the recognition that Afghanistan and Pakistan are effectively one country in the fight against Islamic fundamentalism. To some observers, Pakistan's principal enemy is not India, but its enemy within. The issue, however, is the Pakistani army, part of the world's seventh largest armed force with public estimates of 600,000+ in active service. A professional fighting force, it is the most effective and respected institution in Pakistan, and its main purpose for over sixty years has been to take on India. How the well-entrenched, nuclear armed military can be moderated and redirected in the principal question.

India and America have values and characteristics in common: Diversity and democracy, a federal republic government, equality before the law, a free market philosophy, the English language, entrepreneurial spirit, and vulnerability to Islamic radicalism. If there ever was a time for a strategic alignment of the two countries, it is now. India is a self-assured country, proud of its culture, traditions and methods, and global brands. While the colonial era is receding from memory, India is still sensitive to the extent of respect that it receives or does not receive from the West. For an alliance with India to succeed and bring lasting benefit to both countries, India must be seen as a strategic partner, and not as America's convenient new gendarme in an unstable region. •

*Frank Schell*, a Member of the National Strategy Forum, has recently returned from a fact finding mission to India with the Harris School of Public Policy Studies of the University of Chicago. The Dean's International Council of the Harris School met in New Delhi with a number of leaders in economics, politics and diplomacy, business and IT, journalism, medicine, law and banking, social services and the NGO sector, and national security. Mr. Schell is a former banking executive specializing in trade, treasury and risk management. He worked in a development program based in India (1969-1972) and was later engaged in India offshore banking. He speaks Hindi-Urdu and has traveled extensively in the subcontinent. Read his recent essay published in the *Wall Street Journal's Far Eastern Economic Review*, "Saving India-Pakistan Relations".

# U.S. Intelligence: America's First Line of Defense

*Dr. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr.*

Intelligence remains America's first and most critical line of defense against threats to its national security, and strengthening the U.S. Intelligence Community is one of the greatest imperatives facing the new administration of President-elect Barack Obama.

Since the creation of the U.S. Intelligence Community in 1947 as we generally know it today, more than thirty major reform efforts have been undertaken, from those of President Truman that began in the late 1940s to the Church Committee in the mid-1970s and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. Most of these efforts were occasioned during times of crisis by actual or perceived abuses, weaknesses, or failures of U.S. intelligence, and consequently were highly critical and usually focused on correcting issues short of truly effective reform. Although these reform efforts have made improvements in the organization, management, and mission of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and have provided for Congressional oversight, no reform effort has truly revolutionized the collection and processing of intelligence and how it is distributed to U.S. political

leaders and military commanders at all levels. President-elect Obama's new administration now has the perfect opportunity to capitalize on the zeal, momentum, and bipartisanship of its new start to conduct a zero-based review of the U.S. Intelligence Community. What will the new administration likely find and how should it conduct such a review?

America faces an extraordinarily diverse array of disturbing threats, but the state of the U.S. Intelligence Community is strong and confident. Nevertheless, the new administration will find an exceptionally complex U.S. Intelligence Community that faces politically sensitive and multifaceted personnel, organizational, process, technical, and legal challenges to the collection of intelligence against threats to U.S. national security. Moreover, the new administration must maintain the integrity of our great democracy and resolve these challenges in a way that unequivocally protects the safety, privacy, and civil liberties of all Americans.

This zero-based review should be a bipartisan, joint Executive-Congressional assessment of the U.S. intelligence process as a whole. Its



overarching goal should be to effectively integrate and leverage the efforts of the disparate federation of sixteen elements of executive branch departments and agencies that comprise the U.S. Intelligence Community to maximize their collective provision of timely and objective foreign, military, and domestic intelligence to the President, his senior leadership, military commanders, and the U.S. Congress. To accomplish this goal, the review should resolve each of the personnel, organizational, process, technical, and legal challenges in the context of how to best accomplish the five basic elements of the classic intelligence cycle: collection, processing, analysis, dissemination, and feedback.

*First*, today's men and women of the U.S. Intelligence Community are its greatest asset. A recruitment and personnel system must be created that attracts, trains, and maintains the analytical, technical, and language skills needed by the community. This personnel system must reward the performance of the community's workforce and incentivize behavior that strengthens the elements of the intelligence cycle.

*Second*, the current organizational structure of the U.S. Intelligence Community is perhaps its greatest weakness. The community's sixteen elements operate under their respective departmental or agency

authorities to collect foreign, military, or domestic intelligence, but they are currently led by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who is responsible for the effective integration of this community and the provision of timely and objective intelligence to the President, his senior leadership, military commanders, and the U.S. Congress. Yet, under existing law, the DNI cannot abrogate existing departmental or agency authorities. When the authority, direction, and control over the intelligence function is unclear and intentionally dispersed, no one is truly in charge and responsible.

*Third*, the process challenge is to identify who shall be responsible for each of the five basic elements of the classic intelligence cycle, which must remain as the framework for our core process, and how the processes of the disparate elements of the community will be blended into a unified process. Some of these basic elements such as collection and feedback should perhaps remain a distributed function, while others such as processing, analysis, and dissemination should be centralized. It is clear, however, that information sharing among all elements within the U.S. Intelligence Community as well as with other federal, state, local, tribal, and international authorities must permeate all five elements of the intelligence cycle.

Technology and information fusion centers have proven to be excellent tools to enrich information sharing.

*Fourth*, today's technical challenge of collecting intelligence against the wide array of threats to our national security that range from economic and espionage to terrorism and attacks against U.S. territory and assets abroad is unparalleled to any time in history. Heavily encrypted, world-wide electronic communications are available to anyone with a computer and access to the Internet, which allows threats to U.S. national security to have a world-wide virtual presence while at the same time hiding their identity and location. This ubiquitous access to the Internet creates an almost unimaginable volume of digital data that must be collected, processed, analyzed, and disseminated. Technology-based collection of this magnitude requires more robust and new relationships with the private sector as well as state, local, tribal, and international authorities. Moreover, this volume of information cannot be analyzed – and dots cannot be connected – by only human analysis. The U.S. Intelligence Community must have robust capabilities and authorities for data mining the entire range of databases and information collected and available to the U.S. Government.

*Finally*, and very importantly,

the solutions to these personnel, organizational, process, and technical challenges – as well as how we accomplish collection, processing, analysis, dissemination, and feedback – must be addressed within the framework of U.S. domestic law and must protect the safety, privacy, and civil liberties of all Americans.

It is unrealistic to expect that the U.S. Intelligence Community can detect and thus prevent every threat to U.S. national security, but the goal must remain to do so. Without indicting past reform efforts and intelligence community leaders, President-elect Obama's single most important decision that will strengthen the U.S. Intelligence Community and will ensure an effective zero-based review is to choose exceptionally strong, selfless, and visionary leadership that can effectively manage people, process, and change. IRTPA assigns the DNI the responsibility and authority to serve as the head of the U.S. Intelligence Community; thus the DNI must shoulder the primary responsibility for the performance and continued reform of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The next DNI must ensure the provision of timely and objective foreign, military, and domestic intelligence to the President, his senior leadership, military commanders, and the U.S. Congress. He or she must ensure the seamless



integration and coordination of intelligence with all other elements of national power. A zero-based review may reveal that the U.S. Intelligence Community only needs reform at the margins, but it may recommend dramatic reform and reorganization that could either strengthen or eliminate the position of the DNI. Nevertheless, the next DNI – for however long that position may or may not remain as such – must be a strong, selfless, and visionary leader that can lead reform as well as consolidate, centralize, and manage a disparate federation of sixteen elements of executive branch departments and agencies. •

*Dr. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr.* serves as Senior Associate Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence at the U.S. Department of Defense and as an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center where he currently teaches a graduate-level counterterrorism law seminar entitled “The Law of 24.” Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any governmental agency or civilian institution.

# Cyber Conflict: Recommendations for the Next Administration

*James Lewis*

Most people recognize that the international security environment has changed significantly. American leadership is neither unchallenged nor assured. The United States faces new threats and challenges, including competition among many states and groups. This competition is unlikely to involve battles between armies and fleets. It will focus on gaining political power through economic, technological and financial leadership. To complicate matters, nations that are our competitors in some areas will be our partners in others.

Our opponents will use new technologies in unsuspected ways to gain asymmetric advantage. The immediate threats include terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the vulnerability of the global networks that form cyberspace. Cyberspace is composed of all the interconnected networks that store information and provide services across the globe. National boundaries still exist in cyberspace, but they are weak and porous. Measured by actual damage (as opposed to risk), cyber vulnerabilities are the most dangerous of these threats.

The incoming Administration got a taste of this danger when the FBI notified it this summer that an unknown foreign party had accessed computers at its national campaign headquarters (along with computers at its electoral opponent's headquarters). We do not know what was taken or with whom it was shared. Shortly thereafter, White House networks were also compromised. These incidents followed successes in penetrating networks in Congress, the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce and State, the National Defense University, NASA, and many leading American companies.

Gaining informational superiority is our opponents' goal in cyberspace. Foreign actors routinely access American networks to steal valuable information, eroding our technological leadership, and with it, our economic strength and national security. We should expect these foreign actors to exploit their access to disrupt critical services in a crisis or conflict (and our economy now relies on cyberspace in ways barely envisioned a decade ago). In this, the United States is at a disadvantage. More than most other nations,

the U.S. has integrated networks and digital technologies into our economic life and military and government operations. This provides real benefits by increasing productivity and efficiency, but leading the global migration to cyberspace means we are also more vulnerable than our opponents. In time, this will change, but for now, they have more to gain.

Our primary opponents are the intelligence services and militaries of foreign nations (government sources say Russia and China are the most active), but they also include cyber criminals and foreign corporations engaged in economic espionage. Most are well-equipped and well-resourced, and in cyberspace, the advantage currently lies with the attacker.

Unbounded risk and demonstrable loss are not something that any Administration would want to accept. The Bush Administration, responding to the losses of 2007, created a Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (*see* Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: Protecting Our Federal Networks Against Cyber Attacks,” April 8, 2008). This initiative took several useful steps to secure government networks. Despite its name, however, it was not comprehensive. A comprehensive strategy would use all the tools of U.S. power in a coor-

dated fashion, including diplomacy and international engagement, military strategy, economic policy tools, and the work of the intelligence and law enforcement communities.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) assembled a group of experts in 2007 to develop a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity.\* CSIS used the response to proliferation as a model. With the end of the Cold War, nonproliferation went from being a relatively minor part of national security strategy to become one of its most critical elements. Beginning in 1989, the President created a National Security Council Directorate and issued new policies. State, DOD and the intelligence community established nonproliferation offices. Congress passed legislation providing authorities and sanctions, and regulations were published. The United States strengthened multilateral organizations and made nonproliferation a norm for international behavior. While the risks and requirements are different for cyberspace, the trajectory of the response to proliferation offers a useful precedent for the next Administration and drawing upon it, and we recommend a strategy with four elements:

- Create a **strategic vision**: Cyberspace is now a central element of American national secu-

\* *See*, CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, <http://www.csis.org/tech/cyber/>

rity and economic health. It can no longer be approached in an ad hoc fashion or relegated to IT departments. Our national vision for cyberspace must go beyond security, and look to restructuring government to be both secure and more effective. Security is part of this larger vision. The core of a sound strategy for security is to change our opponent's calculus by increasing costs and risks and by shrinking potential gains from cyber attack.

- Strengthen **governance:** Cybersecurity cuts across the responsibility of many agencies. New organizational models that clarify responsibility, ensure accountability, and increase transparency and collaboration, combined with streamlined partnerships and a clear strategy will help to end the disarray that has left us vulnerable.
- Reinforce **national capabilities:** Federal support for focused R&D and for education and training can provide the people and tools needed to secure cyberspace. Regulation can improve cybersecurity, and for critical cyber infrastructures – telecommunications and information technology, energy, and financial services – the next Administration should use existing regulatory authorities to require change. We advocate a

new approach to regulation that avoids both prescriptive mandates, which could add unnecessary costs and stifle innovation, and overreliance on market forces, which are insufficient for national security. In addition, the federal government, working with industry, can use its acquisitions process to incentivize companies to make more secure IT products.

- Modernize **authorities:** America's laws for cybersecurity are decades old, written for a different and less-connected era. Working with Congress, the next Administration should update these laws.
- Improve **digital identification:** The next Administration should require that government and critical infrastructure functions can be accessed only after robust authentication of identity, using policies and technologies that maintain privacy and civil liberties. We spent much time constructing a recommendation that emphasized that if the United States protects privacy and civil liberties, it can mandate strong authentication for access to critical infrastructure.

A comprehensive cyber strategy should begin with a public statement by the President that the cyber infrastructure of the United States is a vital asset for national security and the economy. The President should also

emphasize that the United States will use all instruments of national power to protect our national security and public safety, ensure economic prosperity, and assure delivery of critical services. This statement puts opponents on notice and may have some deterrent effect. Cybersecurity is among the most serious economic and national security challenges for the United States in the twenty-first century. Losing this struggle will wreak serious damage on our economic health and national security, but at the same time, finding ways to take better advantage of cyberspace will help give the United States a competitive edge in a world where we are currently at a disadvantage. •

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# The Best Defense Is A Good Offense

*Endy Zemenides*

As speculation continues about what direction American foreign policy is going to take under President-elect Obama, it is useful to remember that his primary victory was in part due to his opposition to the war in Iraq. The long term question for American national security strategy is whether the Obama presidency will or should signal a complete repudiation of the Bush Doctrine of preemptive war?

There are at least two reasons to believe that preemptive war is going to remain a part of President Obama's foreign policy toolbox. First, the doctrine of preemptive war is already well accepted both in international law and American diplomatic history. The *Caroline* standards (arising from an 1837 incident between Great Britain and the United States) have established the norm that preemptive war is permitted when the "necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation". Second, the Bush Doctrine does not describe the above norm of preemptive war, but a notion of *preventive* war. Thus, even if the preventive war principles in the Bush Doctrine were repudiated, preemptive war remains an accepted legal norm.

Preemptive war is undoubtedly going to remain part of any future national security strategy, but today's strategic environment make it reasonable to anticipate a new norm of preventive war joining the well accepted *Caroline* standards. It is nearly impossible to conceive a situation where the United States will face a threat similar to a classic example of legitimate preemptive war (the Six Day War in 1967), because the only way to mass forces on the borders of the United States is by playing the board game *Risk*. The nature of today's threats – especially terrorist organizations and weapons of mass destruction – make the *Caroline* standards seem woefully inadequate. A 21st century national security strategy has to adequately defend the country from enemies and threats that attack with lethality and without any warning whatsoever.

While there may be an international consensus against preventive wars like Iraq, the preventive use of force – whether it be for purposes of attacking terrorist groups or for attacking facilities meant to produce weapons of mass destruction – has not been dismissed as a legitimate option even in the circles that were most opposed to Iraq. In fact, even Mi-

chael Doyle – one of the great international law scholars of our time and assistant secretary general and special adviser to former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan – has in recent years put forth new standards for permissible *preventive* war.

The manner in which a new era of preventive war is emerging is fraught with peril. The Bush Doctrine introduced preventive war to the foreign policy toolbox with no standards comparable to the *Caroline* test. Military actions by Ethiopia and Russia, saber rattling between India and Pakistan, and the ongoing saga of Iran all are discussed in terms of prevention. Although unilateral prevention is starting to become more common, only multilateral prevention is legal under the UN Charter (Article 39 of Chapter VII gives the UN Security Council the ability to authorize such preventive action). Continuing along the path of unilateral prevention threatens to upend international legal norms (e.g., the inviolability of state sovereignty) and security structures (e.g., the UN Security Council's exclusive right to authorize preventive war), without leaving anything in place. The choice is then between a new consensus on the use of force in self-defense or international "anarchy".

### *The Way Forward*

The challenge for the international community – given the threats

of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction – is to reconsider customary international law criteria for preemptive self-defense. While scholars like Doyle have put forth proposed norms and several commentators have called for the Security Council to establish new standards for preemptive or preventive use of force, the debate is in very early stages. Establishing new norms is going to require some level of international consensus. While the Security Council is the most appropriate body to establish such norms, it is neither presently constituted in an adequate manner to establish such norms and the states that have done the most to deviate from presently accepted standards hold veto power.

Perhaps a more immediate step forward can be taken in NATO. This alliance is not only made up of democracies, but it also includes the majority of power projecting militaries in the world, most of the states threatened by the new threats of WMDs and terrorists, and three out of the five Security Council members' vetoes. Moreover, as a political matter, it will be far easier to establish these new norms within NATO. The leaders of the countries that pushed hardest for preventive war in Iraq – the U.S., U.K. – and the countries that resisted the most – France, Germany – have changed.

Referring this subject to NATO is not merely a matter of political expediency. Agreed upon norms within

NATO will go a long way towards establishing new customary international law.\* Indeed, there is precedent for this, as legal standards governing humanitarian intervention grew out of NATO's intervention in Kosovo. If NATO powers actually limit their use of preventive self-defense to cases where a *Caroline* type test has been met, even paralysis at the Security Council will not prevent a new international standard for the use of preventive force from being established. Countries would then be able to wield an effective right of self-defense against terrorists and weapons of mass destruction without the ability to invoke preventive self-defense in order to justify offensive actions undertaken for other purposes.

With President-elect Obama stressing the value of America's European allies and with President Sarkozy bringing France back into NATO's unified command, a renewed Western alliance can and should be at the center of a new international security structure that promotes stability, and this stability begins with once again properly defining restrictions on the use of force. •

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\* It is important to note that the *Caroline* test did not emerge from an international legal institution, but from an incident between two nations.



# Smart Soft Power

## An Essential Tool for the Next Administration

*Raja Kamal*

In the last eight years, the Bush administration has exhibited very little effective use of soft power in the Middle East. As we approach a change in the administration in January, the adoption of some “smart” soft power should be on the agenda of the next administration. Soft power, thoroughly discussed by Harvard’s Joseph S. Nye, is culture, values, and ideas as opposed to “hard power” which includes more coercive measures such as military action.

Since September 11, the image of the United States has been deteriorating in much of the Arab world. With the onset of Iraq war in 2003, America’s perception in the Arab world has eroded to a record low. Determined to reverse the trend, on February 14, 2004, the United States government launched *Alhurra* (Arabic for “The Free One”), a satellite broadcasting station aimed at 22 countries in the Middle East. *Alhurra* is an example of a failed soft power policy. Transmitting in Arabic from its Springfield Virginia offices, *Alhurra* was intended as a tool to promote a positive image of the United States. However, in fact, *Alhurra* has

contributed to undermining the image of the United States and can be criticized for misusing taxpayer dollars.

Funded by the taxpayers, with nearly \$500 million spent to date, *Alhurra* was supposed to provide the US perspective on world events to counter the wave of international criticism of the Bush administration. In the Arab world, people naturally and passionately gravitate to news sources, such as the *Aljazeera*, which has been (and continues to be) highly critical of U.S. policies. *Alhurra* was viewed as an essential counter-balance. Instead, *Alhurra* has emerged as a dysfunctional operation with little or no oversight. While the station’s staff is generally composed of Arabs, its management is mostly American. Management speaks no Arabic and has little or no understanding of the complex world they are trying to reach. With no language fluency and no real experience with the Middle East, they are not able to effectively analyze the actual content of the station’s transmissions before they are aired. As a result, *Alhurra* has actually aired programs that were inconsistent with US policy positions and undermine the image of

the U.S. in the Arab world. For example, many of the Lebanese editors and reporters at *Alhurra* are admirers of Michel Aoun of Lebanon. Aoun is one of many Lebanese powerbrokers who aspires to be the President of Lebanon. He is also an ally of Hassan Nasrallah, the Leader of Hezbollah and a self-confessed enemy of the U.S. As a result, *Alhurra* has a disproportionate amount of coverage of Nasrallah's speeches, which present policy positions that are not aligned with those of the U.S.; moreover, they are critical of the U.S. and its leadership.

It is estimated that at best, only two percent of the viewers in the Arab world are watching *Alhurra*, after four years of operations funded by a substantial investment by U.S. taxpayers. For *Alhurra*, penetrating the Arab world media is an uphill battle for two key reasons--lack of credibility and tough competition. Despite the fact that *Alhurra* airs programming that is inconsistent with U.S. policy, the perception in the Arab world is that *Alhurra* is a propaganda vehicle for the U.S. government. Therefore, it lacks the credibility necessary to attract viewers from the Arab street. Moreover, the majority of Arab households access satellite broadcasting. In the Arabian Gulf, 95 percent of households own digital receivers; and even in the poorer Arab nations such as Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, satellite broadcasting penetration tops 75 per-

cent. It is estimated that there are more than 300 available satellite channels in the Arab world. And *Alhurra* is not only competing against Arab-sourced networks, but against highly reputable European sources such as the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) that have had a presence in the Arab world for decades. With such a large menu to choose from, *Alhurra's* odds of success in attracting sufficient viewers to effectively promote U.S. interests in the Arab world are close to zero.

The U.S. government could improve *Alhurra* and make it a "smart" soft power tool. *Alhurra* could be given a broader mission. It could be restructured as a promoter of U.S. values rather than just a distributor of news. Instead of competing ineffectively with *Aljazeera*, the BBC and the many numerous news outlets operating in the region, *Alhurra* could use cultural programming to be a vehicle for better defining U.S. values in a region in which numerous polls suggest there is serious misinformation about U.S. values. An expensive news service would be replaced by a less expensive transmitter of exciting entertainment and cultural programming dubbed in Arabic and geared to help the Arab world better understand U.S. democracy, Americans, and our way of life. In the Arab world, while "democracy," "pluralism," "transparency," and "separation of powers," might be complex and foreign concepts, *Alhurra* could

explain these concepts in a pragmatic way that would connect with the Arab street. For example, the new *Alhurra* would air the well produced and award winning series about *John Adams*, which would give the Arab audience an appreciation for how the United States evolved as a nation with emphasis on the separation of powers and individual rights. And airing the legendary movie, *12 Angry Men*, would help explain the benefits of our legal system and the importance of a jury of our peers. Such content would be an eye opener in most Arab countries. Such programming could be followed by discussions led by prominent legal scholars and policy specialists, from the U.S. and the Middle East. This sort of programming could open millions of eyes and cause populations to readjust their vision of the United States and its leadership in a lasting way.

A reformed and restructured *Alhurra* could play a vital role in changing hearts and minds. Supporting *Alhurra* in its present format is throwing good money after bad. If soft power is to be effective it must be delivered in a medium that will be persuasive for the intended audience. If we want to promote American values in the Arab world and elsewhere in trouble spots around the world, we must redefine *Alhurra*. Soft power is important. Smart soft power is effective. •

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# Whither Goes NATO?

## Institutional Identity in the Twenty-First Century

*Peter R. Faber*

As NATO gamely marches towards its 60th anniversary, one thing is certain – those who invested in its creation will not let it die. They know all too well that creating a common strategic culture is a painstaking process, as is the maintaining of human interoperability. Once these things are lost, putting an enlarged Humpty Dumpty back together again would be possible, but only at truly prohibitive costs. So despite the overheated rhetoric of pundits on both sides of the Atlantic, the question of “whither goes NATO?” has never been about its survival. What it has been, and continues to be about, is NATO’s identity and its utility.

On the question of identity, we immediately face an existential question – is NATO an Article 5 or Article 4 organization? Advocates of the latter view have argued since the 1990s that the Cold War distorted the Alliance’s true identity as a political organization and caused it to over-concentrate on common defense. Its enhanced role in post-Cold War security sector reform and democratization, among other disparate functions, thus represented a return to first principles and not some desperate attempt

to find a new institutional meaning after the death of the Soviet Bear.

The above view of NATO might have become dominant earlier in this decade if a succession of new members had not insisted on continuing to define the Alliance as a geopolitical tool. For them, the Alliance had to continue serving as an Article 5 bulwark against continued Russian attempts at suzerainty, even if they were now primarily political and economic in nature. The new arrivals also came to regard the NATO accession process as the equivalent of honing one’s acting skills in the provinces before playing in a national-level theater, in this case the European Union. Because NATO membership action plans and other requirements were largely circumscribed (i.e., security-centric), candidate nations could develop their procedural “chops” in boutique-like, manageable ways, and therefore prime themselves properly for the complex, multi-pillar demands of EU membership. NATO, in other words, became a prologue to more complex transnational arrangements.

Now if the above “tilts” did not raise questions about NATO’s identi-

ty, then the attempt to redefine it militarily as a light and lethal expeditionary force certainly did. This process began in earnest in the early 2000s, after the United States military began to believe that the Revolution in Military Affairs (now known as “Military Transformation”) could be formalized into a permanent process driven from the top down. In the name of burden sharing, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld particularly wanted garrisoned and heavy mechanized NATO assets to become a nimble transformation force. (No comparable demands were made of Alliance political structures, by the way.) Not surprisingly, particular members of “Old Europe” began to balk at this concept, although at first fitfully and mostly in passive-aggressive ways. Why embrace the concept of a transformational force, they asked, if it perpetuates American primacy in NATO, forces “SWAT Team” concepts of military operations down the throats of dubious allies, and permits the U.S. to continue casting a disproportionately long shadow over European defense policy development, to include driving a wedge between Eastern European nations and the EU. (From the beginning, the perceived sin of “New Europe” was that it sought to divide its interests – i.e., it wanted to rely on the U.S. for its security guarantees and the EU for its economic revitalization. Such choosiness over which EU pillars to embrace remains anath-

ema to Brussels, which sees itself as a three-dimensional institution that must develop and retain three dimensional capabilities, including “hard power.” The recent Russian invasion of Georgia, however, may have ebbed EU progress in this area yet again.)

Despite the continued discomfiture of selected Alliance members with significant parts of NATO transformation, it has served as a prime source of institutional identity up through the organization’s increasingly troubled involvement in Afghanistan. And here NATO’s identity (and by extension utility) now stands. All the dark and recent mutterings about Afghanistan being the Alliance’s Rubicon ultimately turn on the original question – whither goes NATO in the future? Should it finally be Europeanized – i.e., should the U.S.’s role recede and be replaced by a truly collegial relationship among equals? Should the Alliance retreat from its decade-long flirtation with becoming a transformational force – i.e., a burden sharing junior partner helping the U.S. proactively shape and regulate the global commons? If it does retreat from this anti-European Defense and Security Policy (ESDP) approach (at least as a preferred means for solving problems), should the Alliance define its area of operations in geographical terms? (Should it restrict itself, for example, to Western and Eastern Europe proper?) And if NATO comes home, should it privilege an

Article 4 or Article 5 identity? (EU advocates, of course, see no point in pursuing a duplicative Article 4 identity in a “one dimensional” institution run by “old think” nation states.) And finally, if NATO does indeed reemphasize its Article 5 identity, will this mean that it will become an insurance policy tied up in a shoebox in the uppermost corner on the highest shelf in the most inaccessible closet in the house, never to be retrieved, except in extreme emergencies?

The above questions will be answered in due time, but there are three near-term developments we should follow in order to determine whither goes NATO:

*First*, the Alliance must and will update its 1999 Strategic Concept. This pre-9-11 document is a proverbial kitchen sink – i.e., it includes every conceivable threat or risk the Alliance might face in the future. Unfortunately, these threats and risks are equally weighed and valued. In contrast, a new post-9-11 Strategic Concept with clearly identified priorities will go a long way towards defining NATO’s future challenges and interests, and therefore its actual roles and missions.

*Second*, France will return to the Alliance’s military command structure, but how it will do so and what impact its renewed presence will have on NATO-EU military cooperation remains an open question. At the be-

ginning of 2008, the U.S. finally “got off the fence” when viewing the EU as a burgeoning military organization. It accepted President Sarkozy’s assurances that France and its like-minded EU partners seek to complement NATO’s military capabilities rather than eventually supplant or absorb them. At the same time, the French leader continues to argue that Europe must be able to defend itself; that parallel NATO-EU operational planning headquarters are necessary; that the EU needs to field a “pioneer group” of 60,000 soldiers; and that European nations need to drop the *juste retour* principle for military procurement. From a NATO standpoint, these initiatives (and others) are ambiguous at best and ask the Alliance to “trust me.” Well, should it? Its future identity does indeed depend on it.

*Finally*, there is the well-publicized challenge of Afghanistan. Central Asia is now the focal point of world terrorism. Unfortunately, the U.S. and its allies not only mixed up initial success with long-term stability there, but NATO engagement has become, in the view of at least one critic, a huge symptom of the broader adjustments the Alliance has failed to make. A vague overall mandate has led to “troops with caveats” (i.e., varying interpretations of national responsibilities) which has resulted in a two-tier operation (some NATO nations fight, some do not) which has undeni-

ably eroded group solidarity and consensus. So as in the case of a revised Alliance Strategic Concept and a fully reintegrated France in NATO's command structure, how the Alliance disentangles itself from Afghanistan or not will play a critical near-term role in determining its future identity. •

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# NSFR Retrospective 2004-2008:

## What We Got Right, What We Got Wrong, And What We Missed

*Lauren Bean, Editor*

### Editor's Overview

The National Strategy Forum's objective is to anticipate emerging national strategy and national security trends, which we examine in our quarterly national security journal, the *National Strategy Forum Review*. The Review's thematic format is intended to provide readers with an informal, comprehensive curriculum. In the past four years, the *National Strategy Forum Review* has featured articles by leading subject experts, summaries of the monthly NSF lecture series, reports from NSF conferences, and relevant book reviews. Authors were invited to provide context, balanced critical analysis, and recommendations. All issues of the *NSFR* are available online, [www.nationalstrategy.com](http://www.nationalstrategy.com).

Several key trends characterize the past four years of U.S. national strategy and national security. Those which pre-date the 2004-2008 period - the *constants* - include U.S. policy in Iraq and Afghanistan and other counterterrorism efforts carried out by the U.S. and the international community.

Those which have emerged in the last four years include Russia's provocative strategic posturing, Iran's newly acquired regional power status, Venezuela's abrasive anti-American stance, the growing threat of cyber crime and cyber warfare (note the Russia-Georgia conflict, preceded by a cyber attack), the issue of Guantanamo abuses and treatment of detainees, and the need to reconcile traditional warfare needs with irregular warfighting demands.

Following is the *NSFR* quadrennial retrospective for 2004-2008: 'What we got right, What we got wrong, and What we missed'. The retrospective provides a comprehensive overview of the past four years of U.S. foreign policy and national strategy. It can also be useful as we prepare for the next four years under a new administration. Where we're headed is likely where we've already been. All past issues of the *National Strategy Forum Review* are available on our website:

**[www.nationalstrategy.com](http://www.nationalstrategy.com)**



## U.S. ALLIES AND ADVERSARIES, FRIENDS AND FOES... AND STRATEGIC COMPETITORS

**What We Got Right:** U.S. relations abroad suffered a slow decline, in large part because of an imbalance in the allocation of U.S. resources – time, money, and people. Past issues of the *NSFR* identified mistaken prioritization and misallocation of resources. Earlier (2005) optimism about the potential success of U.S. democracy promotion in the Middle East diminished as conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan worsened. In the summer 2005 issue of the *Review*, authors addressed “Democracy and U.S. Foreign Policy.” At the time, most were optimistic – with conditions – about U.S. efforts in the Muslim world, Central Asia, and Africa. Still, authors noted the importance of global perception and the potential damage caused by misperception, i.e. a distrust of U.S. strategic interests. Subsequent *NSFR* issues identified U.S. failure to develop an effective strategy to “win the hearts and minds” of the Muslim world. Authors also called for greater U.S. – European Union cooperation. Efforts to promote democracy abroad could not be managed by the U.S. alone.

- **Russia, Iran, and North Korea** – the global players that currently pose significant challenges to U.S. policy efforts abroad – were examined in previous *NSFR* issues. As Roger Hamburg explained in his article titled, “The Russian Case: Opportunities and Dilemmas for the U.S.,” “Russia is at best an unstable political chameleon...there are dangers of further authoritarian regression.” Iran was cited as a potential aggressor, and both Iran and North Korea were flagged as nuclear actors requiring a more comprehensive U.S. counterstrategy.
- **China** was characterized as a growing regional superpower and a strategic competitor to the U.S., and **Latin America** was the subject of the spring 2008 *NSFR*, which called for more U.S. attention to its neighbors, warned about the threat posed by Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, and examined the crossover of terrorism and narco-trafficking.
- As author Christopher Walker wrote in his article titled, “U.S. Democracy Promotion Efforts in a Post-9/11 Context”, “After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. was forced to acknowledge a radically different international landscape...a mix of transnational threats...replaced traditional threats associated with the Cold War.” As a result, the characterization of U.S. relationships became more layered as the nature of these relationships changed in correlation with the security landscape and U.S. priorities. **The European Union** became the primary U.S. ally (e.g., efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan); while the U.S.-Latin America relationship remained constant. **China and India** became U.S. competitors. **Iran and Venezuela** have emerged as U.S. adversaries, and **Russia** is trending toward becoming an adversary.

*NSFR* authors stressed the need for a comprehensive U.S. national strategy that reflects strategic prioritization of interests: Who are America's allies? How can these alliances be enhanced? Which states pose significant threats? Which states are the U.S. reliant on and which of them also represent security challenges?

**What We Missed:** The National Strategy Forum has paid attention to almost every region in the world, with the exception of Africa. We have featured speakers who have discussed the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), or the movement of terrorists in Africa, but we have not paid sufficient attention to the broader security issues in the region and the impact on U.S. national security strategy.

**For Further Information,** see *NSFR* Issue(s): "Democracy and U.S. Foreign Policy" / V. 14, No. 3; "The Domestic Dimension of U.S. Foreign Policy" / V. 15, No. 2; "U.S. Strategic Relationships: Conflict and Cooperation" / V. 15, No. 3; "A Vision for the Future" / V. 16, No. 1; "Estranged Relations: U.S. Policy in Latin America" / V. 17, No. 2

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## THE WORLD'S WORST NIGHTMARE: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

**What We Got Right:** The threat posed by states and non-state actors seeking nuclear capability has become graver in recent years. Several trends compose a complex threat paradigm, including:

- a further weakened **global nonproliferation regime**
- **Iran**, a regional superpower seeking nuclear weapons development and the potential for a nuclear neighborhood in the Middle East
- The **trafficking in nuclear materials** and the acquisition of materials by terrorists
- The strategic posturing of **Russia** and the "loose nukes" problem; the nuclear pact between India and the U.S.
- **Pakistan's** history of providing nuclear-weapons technology to rogue states such as Libya and Iran and its current efforts to balance the U.S.-India pact.

From 2005-2008, the *NSFR* featured an array of articles on the threat posed by states and non-state actors seeking nuclear capability and the implications for U.S. national strategy and national security.

- Richard Friedman's essay titled "The Informed Terrorist's and Citizen's Guide to Understanding a Nuclear Explosive Device" provided a summary of the basics for understanding a nuclear explosive device and warned that "a new era of nuclear proliferation lies ahead...the nuclear barn door is open."

- *NSFR* author **David Kay** – who led the U.N. inspections after the Persian Gulf War that uncovered the Iraqi nuclear program and the CIA’s Iraq Survey Group – wrote that “Iran, with revolutionary foreign policy goals that call for the destruction of its neighbors appears to be moving toward possession of nuclear weapons.” He laid out a comprehensive strategy based on stronger counterintelligence needed to thwart the trafficking of nuclear materials, securing existing nuclear stockpiles in Pakistan and India, more cooperative global diplomatic efforts, and a reexamination by nuclear states of “their own strategies and practices to ensure that they contribute to the goals of non-proliferation.”
- **Stephen Schwartz, author of *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940***, warned: “If a credible nuclear terror plot is detected or if terrorists actually succeed in detonating a nuclear weapon anywhere in the world, particularly in the United States, we can expect sweeping and disruptive changes in our way of life that would make those implemented after 9/11 pale in comparison.” He writes that coping with the costs of a nuclear attack “could easily exceed \$1 trillion.”
- **Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.**, wrote, “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for many years has been the centerpiece of world security.” However, nuclear weapon states such as the U.S. are received unevenly by those states which America currently seeks to negotiate away from developing nuclear weapons (Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea). As Ambassador Graham wrote in his *NSFR* 2007 article, “Over the long run, the NPT will be viewed by many of the nonnuclear weapon NPT parties as hopelessly discriminatory in favor of the five nuclear weapon states and therefore untenable.”

The authors offered a strong warning, that the world’s worst nightmare will become reality if the global non-proliferation regime does not work collectively to establish a viable, non-discriminatory non-proliferation treaty with worldwide support. All called for more committed efforts to advance toward this end.

**For Further Information**, see *NSFR* Issue(s): “The Consequences of a Nuclear Armed World” / V 16, No. 2; “Asymmetry: Strategies for Adapting to Contemporary Security Threats” / V. 16, No. 3

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## THE CHANGING NATURE OF CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

**What We Got Right:** Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has been the sole global superpower. Prior to events subsequent to the September 11th attacks

and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. could exercise its power unchallenged. What the U.S. learned, and several authors in the *NSFR* concluded, is that asymmetry – or “a lack of balance, proportion, and harmony” – is bad when a weaker force incapacitates or overtakes a stronger force. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the imbalance has not been in America’s favor in the recent past.

The summer 2007 issue defines *Irregular Warfare* as: “A form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority... favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric advantages, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will” (*see* David Grange’s article titled, “Developing Irregular Warfare Leaders for the 21st Century”). This issue also provides a clearly structured framework for understanding irregular warfare, or as it is also known, *Asymmetric* (or *Asymmetrical*) Warfare.

Since 2005, the U.S. has invested considerable resources in rethinking how to engage in warfighting. The initial unwillingness of military leaders to adapt to the warfighting demands of the 21st century has lessened in recent years. However, the U.S. is only part way there. As author John Allen Williams notes in his article “Understanding Asymmetric Warfare,” “The U.S. will always have a problem with asymmetrical conflicts, given our traditional mind set and the impact of legacy systems acquired for the kind of wars we prefer to fight.”

A recent speaker’s summary of May, 2008, NSF speaker Lt. General David Valcourt, Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff of US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), highlighted his remarks on the newly updated Army Field Manual FM 3-0. The manual, as he explained, reflects the need for a greater “human dimension” – an emphasis on multi-purpose training for troops, culture and language, and the importance of “Stability Operations.” The need for a “human dimension” is noted by past NSF authors, specifically those who have had “boots on the ground” experience in Afghanistan and/or Iraq, such as Lt. Colonel Kevin Farrell (*see* “A Year in Iraq: A Soldier’s View on Irregular Warfare and Counterinsurgency”, summer 2007).

Past *NSFR* issues, including lead articles, recent speaker summaries, and conference summaries have examined the multidimensional challenge the U.S. confronts as it adapts to the changing demands of irregular warfare in the 21st century. These include demographics and declining enlistment rates, defense budgetary constraints, the importance of science and technology, and critical strategy deficits.

**For Further Information**, see *NSFR* Issue(s): “Asymmetry: Strategies for Adapting to Contemporary Security Threats” / V. 16, No. 3; “Hedging Against Uncertainty: U.S. Strategy in an Interdependent World” / V. 17, No. 3; “Violence and National Security” / V. 17, No. 4

## U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM

*What We Got Right:* Past issues of the *NSFR* identified how the nature of terrorism has changed in recent years and offered insights about new and emerging threats the U.S. will likely confront in coming years. Several factors have contributed to the spread of terrorism, among them:

- Steadily worsening conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq
- Regional instability, and the application of the Internet which has led to increased interconnectivity among terrorist individuals and groups
- Moreover, the “look” of the threat has changed. Offshoots of Al Qaeda – informal, loose networks of individuals, or copycat groups – have proliferated, and the recruitment of women and children by terrorist groups has increased.

The U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism communities have devised strategies and tactics in recent years to adapt to emerging trends, but new threats continue to emerge:

- **Robert Killebrew** wrote about the crossover of **urban gang warfare and terrorism** and the need for improved federal and local counterterrorism cooperation.
- **Harvey Rishikof** examined the need for an improved domestic **counterterrorism paradigm for the digital age**.
- Dr. Gerald Epstein presented the complex **bioterrorism threat** challenge.
- K.A. Taipele called for an enhanced **information strategy to counter terrorism on the Internet**.

Authors have also identified the need for improved international cooperation for effective global counterterrorism. Given the impact of globalization, the movement of people, goods, and money across borders, and increased reliance on foreign partners, past issues of the *NSFR* have examined what strategies and institutions can be revisited and rethought to adapt to the current security landscape. NATO and the United Nations, in particular, have been examined extensively in past issues of the journal. Authors have identified barriers to their effectiveness and have offered recommendations for maximizing their role. Still, circumstances in Iraq, Afghanistan, the spread of anti-American sentiment abroad, and other policy challenges have stalled efforts intended to reenergize international institutions established to protect international security.

All of these issues contain a legal dimension. The *NSFR* often examines the legal implications of the 21st century threat landscape and what is required to resolve the tensions between security and civil liberties. From the Guantanamo detainees and the issue of due process to the need for an improved international legal regime,

*NSFR* authors have anticipated the most pressing legal issues the U.S. confronts.

**For Further Information**, see *NSFR* Issue(s): “Asymmetry: Strategies for Adapting to Contemporary Security Threats” / V. 16, No. 3; “Age of Disruption” / V. 17, No. 1; “Violence and National Security” / V. 17, No. 4

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## CATASTROPHIC PREPAREDNESS: PERSONAL SAFETY AND SECURITY

**What We Got Right:** ‘Personal safety and security’ is one of the foundational elements of the National Strategy Forum’s curriculum. Several past issues of the *NSFR* have examined preparedness for a catastrophic incident (e.g., natural disaster, terrorist attack) from the often differing perspectives of government officials and entities, public not-for-profit organizations, private sector representatives, and American citizens.

Past *NSFR* issues, in lead articles, conference summaries, and recent speaker essays, have examined key issues:

- **What motivates the public to prepare for a possible catastrophic event (terrorist attack, natural disaster)?**
- **How can we improve the level of preparedness in America?**

The winter 2005 issue, “Catastrophic Incidents: Me, My Family, My Community, My Country” framed the highly complex challenge of ‘getting America prepared’. Authors examined detection of and preparedness for catastrophic incidents, planning and response, challenges to state and local cooperation for catastrophic preparedness, and how to improve America’s resiliency. Yet recent natural disasters suggest America is not fully prepared to respond effectively.

U.S. critical infrastructure is vulnerable to a variety of attacks which could have grave implications for America’s transportation, financial, telecommunications, and health sectors. Past issues of the *NSFR* identify three primary barriers to improved preparedness levels in America:

- **A cooperation deficit between the local and federal levels**
- **A culture of fear** and resultant **complacency**
- **Misinformation** between the organizations responsible for preparedness and the public

Looking ahead, authors have presented recommendations for strategies and tactics that relevant federal, state, and local government agencies can employ to improve preparedness levels in America. Creating a culture of pre-

paredness, authors have suggested, requires an all-inclusive approach in which all stakeholders – government, private, and public – have shared responsibility for themselves, their families, their communities, and their country.

**What We Missed:** The *NSFR* has examined the vulnerability of the U.S. financial networks to terrorist attacks. It has also addressed the economic dimension of defense. We did not, however, anticipate the current global economic crisis. But, we followed our own advice and adapted to circumstances by publishing a special report on the implications of the economic crisis for national strategy, which is available on our website. “The Global Economic Crisis and U.S. National Strategy” report includes an analysis of the crisis and it examines the impact on the U.S. military and identifies the possible long-term domestic effects.

**For Further Information,** see *NSFR* Issue(s): “Catastrophic Incidents: Me, My Family, My Community, My Country” / V. 15, No. 1; “The Age of Disruption” / V. 17, No. 1; “Violence and National Security” / V. 17, No. 4

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## DOMESTIC TRENDS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS: IMMIGRATION, DEMOGRAPHICS, AND ECONOMICS

**What We Got Right:** Immigration, demographics, and economics are overlapping trends with shared consequences for the U.S. and the international community.

- In the U.S., a **declining birthrate** is a concern, yet achieving demographic reform, as one author noted, is difficult and is evidenced by Congress’s inability to enact comprehensive immigration legislation.
- Abroad, **demographic trends in Russia** (losing 700,000 of its 146 million), a country awash in oil revenue, suggest Russia’s political stability is restricted by its declining population.
- The **aging of the developed world and declining fertility rates, youth bulges in the Islamic world, health issues in China and Russia, and the rise of urban/megacities**, and other demographic trends, as Endy Zemenides wrote in his article, “Demographics and Destiny”, “can change the way we define a nation’s power...affect a nation’s strategic posture...change the way we fight wars...[and]...add reasons for fighting wars.”
- **Lawrence Korb and Sean Duggan** wrote a widely reprinted essay on the impact of **demographics on the U.S. military** and cautioned that the quality standards should not be lowered amid concerns about recruitment rates.



Despite existing controversies, author Arthur Cyr wrote for the fall 2007 *NSFR*, **the American immigrant experience has had generally positive national security implications.** He explains that a diverse population, and the relative youth population in America, provide advantages for U.S. military forces and create an environment of social and cultural openness which is an important underpinning for America's security ("less likely to encourage successful domestically-rooted terrorism"). An NSF conference summary on the subject identified appropriate national security policies on immigration. The summary identifies the paramount objective as "preventing people who pose a threat to U.S. security from crossing the border," but warns that not every immigration policy and procedure should be analyzed from a national security perspective. Still, editor John Allen Williams writes, **"National security-related immigration policy involves principles of management, not risk elimination; choices must be made based upon values, probabilities, potential degrees of harm, and the national interest."**

The **downward spiral of the U.S. economy** is the dark cloud hanging over our heads and is likely to remain for some time. The *NSFR* special supplement notes that it is too early to speculate about the longer term consequences of the current economic crisis, but as author Frank Schell wrote in his essay, "Call Out the Leviathan": "Until confidence is restored in our financial system, we will not see a return to normalcy...The disturbing question is how can so many brilliant minds and mathematical models be caught so unprepared?" Author Endy Zemenides writes, "...budgetary deficits and the national debt are going to present the greatest long term challenge to our government."

***For Further Information***, see *NSFR* Issue(s): "People, Populations, and Problems" / V. 16, No. 4; *NSFR* Special Supplement "The Global Economic Crisis and U.S. National Strategy" / October, 2008



# Book Review

*Hot, Flat, and Crowded:*

*Why We Need a Green Revolution and How It Can Change America*

Thomas Friedman

Farrar, Straus and Giroux

448 Pages, September 2008

Review By Marilyn Diamond

*“Global warming, the stunning rise of middle classes all over the world, and rapid population growth have converged in a way that could make our planet dangerously unstable. In particular, the convergence of hot, flat, and crowded is tightening energy supplies, intensifying the extinction of plants and animals, deepening energy poverty, strengthening petro dictatorship, and accelerating climate change.”*

Thus warns Thomas Friedman, three-time Pulitzer Prize winner, in his latest best seller, *Hot, Flat, and Crowded: Why We Need a Green Revolution and How It Can Change America*. Delivered with Friedman’s characteristic accessibility, wit, and unwavering belief in America, it is none the less a sobering, incisive, and provocative read. Friedman has traveled the globe collecting evidence to support his assertions. The book is

rife with examples from scientists, policy makers, business people, and as always, anecdotes from Main Street. Hence its 400 plus page heft.

In the first part of the book, Friedman gives a bleak account of where we are and how we got here.

The flat world we live in, says Friedman, is a level economic playing field with decreasing barriers between countries and people. World population has tripled in our lifetime, and that population is increasingly gaining access to American levels of consumerism. Today, the approximately 2-3 billion people who drive cars, own air-conditioners and refrigerators, are driving the demand for energy to levels that Friedman says are, “unsustainable, dangerous, and threaten the Earth’s stability.”

“Spewing more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere is pushing the earth’s temperature to dangerously high levels, robbing us of our precious biodiversity, and destroying a unique species every 20 minutes.

At the same time, we are funding petrodictators, the autocrats who tend to control the world's reserves of fossil fuels, and who use some of the windfall of our energy purchases to support anti-American terrorist groups, suicide bombers, and preachers." Moreover, we are increasing the gap between the energy "haves" and "have nots". "Code Green", Friedman-speaks for a new security designation, gives us a ten year window of opportunity to rescue ourselves. The key word is *opportunity*.

This brings us to part two of the book, which is exceedingly positive. Friedman quotes John Gardner, founder of Common Cause and fellow optimist, "Americans need to recognize a series of great opportunities disguised as insoluble problems and blaze a new path for others to follow." That path includes constructing an entirely new Clean Energy System that would restructure American utilities so that their rewards come from using less, not more of their current product, and from purchasing energy from cleaner sources.

Friedman's concrete proposals, to be set by the Federal Government, include: increasing the cost of hydrocarbons with new taxes and a price floor, and lowering the cost of alternative fuels, with tax breaks, until clean industries achieve scale and can compete without subsidies. Friedman argues that there is precedent for this

kind of government intervention.

"For years Washington has subsidized oil, gas, and coal, giving minimal help to wind and solar power". Friedman observes, "It is a market designed to keep fossil fuels cheap and renewables expensive and elusive. Would you rather shell out to the Saudi, Russian, and Venezuelan treasuries, as you now do, or to the United States Treasury?"

If America invests in Green, says Friedman, self-interest will propel others to follow suit. After all, he says, there is a lot of money to be made. Conversely, if we keep our dirty fuel economy, we give China and India an excuse to do the same, and if China doesn't go Green, "its emissions and appetites will nullify everything everyone else does to save the Earth."

Friedman believes we can achieve an E.C.E., Energy Climate Era, through the kind of Presidential leadership demonstrated by Abraham Lincoln and FDR. That level of authority can face down powerful big corporate lobbies and create a single national system that would "instantly release the pent up innovation and creativity that is ready to go to work." Friedman is confident that America will "summon its greatest natural resources: intelligence, creativity, boldness, and concern for the common good, to take on the biggest innovation project in American history."

Friedman who calls himself a

sober optimist, says, “If you are not sober about the scale of the challenge, you are not paying attention. But if you are not an optimist, you have no chance of generating the kind of mass movement needed to achieve the needed scale.”

It’s hard for me to connect with Friedman’s faith in policy makers, or in a single charismatic leader to inspire the American people to give up their addiction to fossil fuels and to impose a painful and radical restructuring of our Energy Policy, especially when the price of oil is plummeting. That kind of change happens in America when we all perceive we are in an extreme crisis. But whether the reader shares Friedman’s sober optimism or not doesn’t matter. What matters is that the book be read and taken seriously. It contains sufficient material to convince the reader that this crisis is different, that by the time we dial up 911, it will be too late. And here, I believe, lies Friedman’s laudable contribution. Of that, I am exuberantly optimistic. •

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